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As the case that became Whole Woman' Health' worked its way to the Su-
preme Court, few were confident about how the Court would respond to a law,
enacted in the name of protecting women's health, that would predictably shut
most of a state's abortion clinics. All agreed that the governing standard was
the undue burden framework the Court had adopted a quarter century earlier
in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.2 But the meaning of "undue burden" was in
doubt. Opponents of the abortion right asserted that after the Court decided
Gonzales v. Carhart, upholding the Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act, the Casey
framework meant little more than rational basis deference to legislative deci-
sion making.' Supporters were confident that the undue burden framework
provided women more constitutional protection than that -but many still wor-
ried that the standard was too indeterminate to constrain state legislatures.
In Whole Woman' Health, the Court defied those expectations and held that
Casey's undue burden framework imposes real limits on state efforts to restrict
1. Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
2. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
3. 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
4. See, e.g., Brief for Respondents at 21-23, Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct.
2292 (2016) (No. 15-274). Lawyers for a leading antiabortion advocate, Americans United
For Life, see infra notes 20-24, served as counsel of record for a group of state officials whose
amicus brief was devoted to advancing the rational basis argument, see Amicus Curiae Brief
of More than 450 Bipartisan and Bicameral State Legislators and Lieutenant Governors in
Support of the Respondents and Affirmance of the Fifth Circuit, Whole Woman's Health v.
Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016) (No. 15-274).
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women's access to abortion. The opinion decisively reaffirms robust judicial
protection for the right declared two generations ago and under relentless at-
tack for much of the time since.
This Essay draws on our recent article on health-justified abortion re-
strictions - Casey and the Clinic Closings: When "Protecting Health" Obstructs
Choice'-to offer a brief account of the social movement strategy and the lower
court rulings that led to the judgment in Whole Woman' Health. We show that
in Whole Woman's Health the Court applies the undue burden framework in
ways that have the potential to reshape the abortion conflict.
The Court's most recent abortion decision repudiates rational-basis claims
about Casey.6 Crucially, the decision instructs judges how to apply the Casey
framework in evaluating the benefits and burdens of restrictions on abortion.
In Whole Woman's Health, the Court weighed Texas's interest in enacting the
challenged law, with close attention to scientific evidence about the health ben-
efits of regulating abortion,' and it evaluated the burdens imposed by the Texas
law, with close attention to the many ways abortion restrictions can adversely
affect the conditions in which women exercise their rights.' The methods the
Court employed to identify and to balance benefits and burdens call into ques-
tion myriad health-justified restrictions on abortion.' The guidance the Court
provided judges in identifying benefits and burdens under the Casey frame-
work applies in cases challenging fetal-protective restrictions on abortion as
well. 1
1. THE "TRAP LAW" STRATEGY
In 2013 Texas enacted a law requiring abortion providers to secure admit-
ting privileges at nearby hospitals and requiring clinics to outfit themselves as
ambulatory surgical centers." The asserted purpose of the law was to protect
women's health. In an important sense the law had its origins in the Casey deci-
5. Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Casey and the Clinic Closings: When "Protecting Health"
Obstructs Choice, 125 YALE L.J. 1428 (2016).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 48-50.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 55-69.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 70-74.
9. Leaders of antiabortion organizations are adjusting their strategies in response to the deci-
sion. See infra note 55.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 74-76.
n1. See Act of July 18, 2013, 2013 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4795-4802 (West) (codified at TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 171.0031, 171.041-048, 171.061-064, 245.010-011 (West,
Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.); TEX. Occ. CODE ANN. §§ 164.052, 164.055 (West,
Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.)).
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sion itself. In the years preceding Casey, opponents of abortion sought Roe v.
Wade'sl2 overruling." Instead the Court narrowed Roe but reaffirmed the right
to abortion before fetal viability.14 It held that a state could enact legislation to
promote the state's interests in potential life and in women's health throughout
pregnancy, so long as the laws did not impose an undue burden on a woman's
decision about whether to carry a pregnancy to term."s The Court defined an
undue burden as "a state regulation [that] has the purpose or effect of placing a
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable
fetus.' 16 In upholding Pennsylvania's requirement of a waiting period and
mandatory counseling," Casey authorized forms of fetal-protective regulation
that Roe had barred. Opponents quickly seized on this opportunity to enact
laws that might accomplish incrementally and indirectly what Casey forbade
their doing directly.
Some of the laws that states enacted sought, like the measures in Casey, to
dissuade women from acting on a decision to end a pregnancy. But others im-
posed requirements on abortion providers in the name of protecting women's
health. These laws-which critics dubbed TRAP laws, for "Targeted Regula-
tion of Abortion Providers" -single out abortion for onerous forms of regula-
tion not applied to procedures of equivalent or greater medical risk." By sin-
gling out abortion providers for onerous regulation concerning building
standards, licensing, telemedicine, and admitting privileges, TRAP laws work
either to raise the cost of providing abortions or to put providers out of busi-
ness altogether. 1
12. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
13. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellants at 25, Thorn-
burgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (Nos. 84-495 &
84-1379) (calling for the overruling of Roe).
14. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 869-70 (1992).
15. Id. at 876-77.
16. Id. at 877.
17. Id. at 881-87.
18. See Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 5, at 1444-49.
19. For examples of recent TRAP laws, see Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers,
GUTTMACHER INST,, http://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/targeted-regulation
-abortion-providers [http://perma.cc/5N56-64UR]. For accounts of how TRAP laws affect
access, see, for example, Kathryn Smith, Va. Tightens Abortion-Clinic Rules, POLITICO (Apr.
15, 2013), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/o4/virginia-adopts-stricter-rules-for
-abortion-clinics-o90042 [http://perma.cc/TT4V-QHKH]; and Esm6 E. Deprez,
Abortion Clinics Are Closing at a Record Pace, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 24, 2016), http://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2ol6-o2-24/abortion-clinics-are-closing-at-a-record
-pace [http://perma.cc/45DV-SQH2], which reported that "[s]tate regulations that make it
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Americans United For Life (AUL), an organization dedicated to ending
abortion through its incremental regulation, is a primary proponent of the
woman's health justification for restricting abortion and an architect of TRAP
laws, including those at issue in the Texas case. 20 The group provides states
model legislation that it claims will protect life and protect women's health.21
The organization's recent past-President, Charmaine Yoest, was frank in de-
scribing AUL's state legislative strategy: "As we're moving forward at the state
level, we end up hollowing out Roe, even without the Supreme Court."22 Dan
too expensive or logistically impossible for facilities to remain in business drove more than a
quarter of the [clinic] closings.'
TRAP laws have closed or threatened to close clinics in large numbers, leaving many
states with few remaining sites to meet patient needs. For example, the combination of Tex-
as's admitting privileges and ambulatory surgical center requirements would have closed
approximately three-fourths of the forty-one clinics in the state. See Greenhouse & Siegel,
supra note 5, at 1430; see also Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2312,
2317 (2016) (describing the effect of the requirements on the numbers of abortion facilities).
Mississippi's admitting privileges law would have resulted in the closing of the state's last
remaining abortion clinic. See Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 5, at 1450. If allowed to go in-
to effect, Wisconsin's admitting privileges requirement would have closed two of the state's
four clinics. See id. at 1451. Louisiana's admitting privileges requirement was enjoined be-
cause enforcement would leave "four of the five clinics in the state without an abortion pro-
vider and the last remaining clinic with only one provider." Id. For additional data on the de-
clining numbers of abortion clinics due to regulations, see Laura Bassett, Anti-Abortion Laws
Take Dramatic Toll on Clinics Nationwide, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug.
26, 2013, 7:30 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/o8/26/abortion-clinic
-closuresn3804529.html [http://perma.cc/T6ZF-PYJX]; and Deprez, supra. For an ac-
count of the dozens of states with admitting privileges and ambulatory surgical center re-
quirements comparable to those struck down by the Court in Whole Woman's Health, see
Jennifer Prohov, What Effect Will the Court's Abortion Ruling Have on Laws in Other
States? SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 19, 2016), http://www.scotusblog.com/2o16/o9/what
-effect-will-the-courts-abortion-ruling-have-on-laws-in-other-states/ [http://perma.cc
/6FW7-TMXU].
20. Zoe Carpenter, The Big Lie at the Heart of the Texas Abortion Clinic Case, THE
NATION (Mar. 1, 2016), http://www.thenation.com/article/the-big-lie-at-the-heart-of
-the-texas-abortion-clinic-case [http://perma.cc/F357-9R7P]; Erica Hellerstein, Inside the
Highly Sophisticated Group That's Quietly Making It Much Harder to Get an Abortion,
THINKPROGRESS (Dec. 2, 2014), http://thinkprogress.org/health/2014/12/02/3597770
/americans-united-life-abortion [http://perma.cc/CH4U-Q7CD]. For an early statement of
AUL's incremental strategy, see Victor G. Rosenblum and Thomas J. Marzen, Strategies for
Reversing Roe v. Wade Through the Courts, in ABORTION AND THE CONSTITUTION: REVERSING
ROE V. WADE THROUGH THE COURTS 195, 196-197 (Dennis J. Horan et al. eds., 1987).
21. See AMERICANS UNITED FOR LIFE, DEFENDING LIFE, http://www.aul.org/defending-life
-2015/ [http://perma.cc/3Z8D-Y4ER].
22. Emily Bazelon, Charmaine Yoest's Cheerful War on Abortion, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Nov. 4, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.coM/2o12/11/o4/magazine/charmaine-yoests-cheerful-war
-on-abortion.html [http://perma.cc/XWW6-87C9]. At the same time, the organization's
model legislation is designed to encourage the courts to narrow Roe. See Clarke D. Forsythe,
A Legal Strategy to Overturn Roe v. Wade After Webster: Some Lessons from Lincoln, 1991 BYU
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McConchie, the organization's vice president of government affairs, explained,
"States can't outlaw abortion. That does not mean there's a constitutional right
to abortion being convenient." 2 3
AUL advised Texas in drafting its law.24 The law's supporters well appreci-
ated that it would close clinics. The day after the Texas Senate approved the bill
requiring providers to obtain admitting privileges and to outfit themselves as
ambulatory surgical centers, then-Lieutenant Governor David Dewhurst tweet-
ed a photo of a map that showed all of the abortion clinics that would close as a
result of the bill. "We fought to pass S.B. 5 thru the Senate last night, & this is
why!"25 He then followed with a second tweet: "I am unapologetically pro-life
AND a strong supporter of protecting women's health. #SB5 does both."26
The district court found that, prior to the law's passage, abortion in the
state of Texas was "extremely safe," that the law's requirements did not make
the procedure safer, and that the combined operation of the admitting privileg-
es and the surgical center requirements would close "almost all abortion clinics
in Texas," and thus create an "impermissible obstacle" to abortion in the state.2 7
But in a series of opinions the Fifth Circuit reversed and rebuked the district
judge for interfering with the prerogatives of the legislature. The Fifth Circuit
read the Supreme Court's decision in Gonzales v. Carhart as incorporating ra-
tional basis review into the undue burden inquiry, and then, even more expan-
sively, insisted that "[n]othing in the Supreme Court's abortion jurisprudence
deviates from the essential attributes of the rational basis test, which affirms a
vital principle of democratic self-government."2 8 It forbade the trial court from
examining the evidence supporting the state's reasons for regulating: "The
L. REV. 519, 534 (1991) ("The legislation is carefully designed to present particular abortion
issues to the courts that test Supreme Court doctrine and that will encourage the courts, and
ultimately the Supreme Court, to cut back on Roe v. Wade or to readdress and overrule it.").
23. Olga Khazan, Planning the End of Abortion, THE ATLANTIC (July
16, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/o7/what-pro-life-activists
-really-want/398297/ [http://perma.cc/8GKR-9UGS].
24. See Carpenter, supra note 20 ("A year after he signed the legislation into law, former Texas
Governor Rick Perry thanked AUL for playing 'a key role in developing and promoting leg-
islation."').
25. David Dewhurst (@DavidHDewhurst), TWITTER (June 19, 2013, 7:41 AM), http://
twitter.com/DavidHDewhurst/status/3473634424973o2528/photo/ [http://perma.cc
/3QF2-U6QQ].
26. Id.; see also Becca Aaronson, Dewhurst Tweet on Abortion Bill Raises Eyebrows, THE TEX. TRIB.
(June 19, 2013), http://www.texastribune.org/2013/o6/19/dewhurst-tweet-praising
-abortion-bill-raises-eyebr/ [http://perma.cc/3SVU-A3MH].
27. Whole Woman's Health v. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d 673, 684, 687-88 (W.D. Tex. 2014).
28. Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott ("Abbott II"), 748 F.3d
583, 590, 594 (5 th Cir. 2014).
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first-step in the analysis of an abortion regulation, however, is rational basis re-
view, not empirical basis review."29 The Circuit admonished the district court
for "evaluat[ing] whether the ambulatory surgical center provision would actu-
ally improve women's health and safety," asserting that "[i] n our circuit we do
not balance the wisdom or effectiveness of a law against the burdens the law
imposes."o
In characterizing the Casey framework as mandating rational basis defer-
ence to state legislatures, the Fifth Circuit broke with the Ninth and Seventh
Circuits, which understood the undue burden inquiry to require judges to ex-
amine the evidentiary basis of the state's claim to regulate in the interest of
women's health, and then to balance whatever medical benefit, if any, the regu-
lation conferred against the burden the regulation imposed."As Judge Richard
Posner put it, "The feebler the medical grounds, the likelier the burden, even if
slight, to be 'undue' in the sense of disproportionate or gratuitous."32
II. HOW CASEY CONSTRAINS TRAP LAWS
As we have argued in this Journal, the Fifth Circuit flatly misconstrued the
Casey framework." Of course, Casey requires judges to balance the benefits of
regulating abortion against the burdens on access that a law imposes; how else
would a judge determine a burden is "undue?"34 The determination of which
burdens are "undue" is inherently comparative and contextual.3 5 And it is em-
pirical. In applying undue burden analysis to health regulations in Casey itself,
the Court observed that "Unnecessary health regulations that have the purpose
or effect of presenting a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion
impose an undue burden on the right." 6 How are judges to determine whether
a health regulation is "unnecessary" without examining the evidence support-
ing the state's case for regulating?
But, as we have argued, there is a deeper reason why judges must examine
the factual basis of the state's claim to regulate abortion in the interests of pro-
tecting women's health. In Casey, the Supreme Court revised the Roe frame-
work to allow the state greater opportunities to protect life throughout preg-
29. Id. at 596.
30. Whole Woman's Health v. Lakey, 769 F.3d 285, 297 (5 th Cir. 2014).
31. Planned Parenthood of Ariz. v. Humble, 753 F.3 d 905 ( 9 th Cir. 2014); Planned Parenthood
of Wis. v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3 d 786 (7 th Cir. 2013).
32. Van Hollen, 738 F 3d at 798.
33. Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 5, at 1466-73.
34. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992).
35. Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 5, at 1476-78.
36. Casey, S5 U.S. at 878-79.
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nancy." Yet, at one and the same time, Casey affirmed a woman's right to de-
cide whether to carry a pregnancy to term: "These matters, involving the most
intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central
to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment."" For this reason, Casey imposed crucial restrictions
on the means by which the government could protect fetal life: " [T] he means
chosen by the State to further the interest in potential life must be calculated to
inform the woman's free choice, not hinder it."" Under Casey, states can protect
potential life by persuading a woman to carry a pregnancy to term, but may not
do so by obstructing her access to abortion.
Thus, while government can enact dissuasive regulation to protect unborn
life, it cannot achieve that end through unnecessary health regulations that
have the effect of obstructing access. Yet at numerous junctures Texas was open
in claiming a fetal-protective goal in enacting the admitting privileges and sur-
gical center requirement. The Governor of Texas explained that "Texas' goal is
to protect innocent life, while ensuring the highest health and safety standards
for women,"4 0 and state officials repeatedly acknowledged that they sought to
protect unborn life as well as women's health. 4
Even when the state was not expressly invoking its interest in protecting
unborn life, it made that goal apparent in the way it singled out abortion for
health regulation. Texas engaged in what we have called "abortion exceptional-
ism'" treating the health regulation of abortion differently from other forms of
health regulation.42 Singling out abortion for onerous health regulation that is
not applied to other medical procedures of similar or even greater risk, out of
37. Id. at 872-73.
38. Id. at 851.
39. Id. at 877.
40. Governor Abbott Statement on Supreme Court's HB 2 Ruling, OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR GREG
ABBOTT (June 27, 2016), http://gov.texas.gov/news/press-release/22427 [http://perma.cc
/Y32M-65DS]. The Governor of Mississippi described the goals of an admitting privilege
law that threatened to close the last abortion clinic in the state in remarkably similar terms.
See Phil Bryant, Miss. Governor, State of the State Address (Jan. 22, 2014), http://
www.jacksonfreepress.com/news/2o14/jan/22/gov-bryants-state-state-speech
[http://perma .cc/RV77-AP75]; Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 5, at 1452.
41. For examples, see Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 5, at 1452 n.115, 1452-53 n.117; and supra
text accompanying note 26. Advocates also depicted the Texas legislation as designed to pro-
tect unborn life. See Steven Ertelt, Supreme Court Overturns Texas Law Saving Tens of Thou-
sands of Babies From Abortion, LIFE NEWS (June 27, 2016, 10:12 AM), http://
www.lifenews.com/2016/o6/27/supreme-court-overturns-texas-law-saving-tens-of-
thousands-of-babies-from-abortion/ [http://perma.cc/SCJ4-QR8C].
42. See Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 5, at 1446-49.
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express or implied concern for unborn life, is constitutionally suspect.43 Dis-
parate and unwarranted health regulation that hinders exercise of women's
choice violates Casey's protections for women's dignity.4 4
III. PROTECTING THE WHOLE WOMAN
The Supreme Court's opinion in Whole Woman's Health is remarkable for
its total repudiation of the Fifth Circuit's reading of the undue burden frame-
work,45 and more broadly, of the TRAP law strategy that Texas and other states
employed.
Specifically rejecting the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit, Justice Breyer insists
that Casey requires balancing: "The rule announced in Casey. .. requires that
courts consider the burdens a law imposes on abortion access together with the
benefits those laws confer."4 6 In "weigh[ing] the asserted benefits against the
burdens . . . the District Court applied the correct legal standard."4 7 And the
Court chastises the Fifth Circuit for suggesting that rational basis applied, ob-
serving that the Court of Appeals was "wrong to equate the judicial review ap-
plicable to the regulation of a constitutionally protected personal liberty with
the less strict review applicable where, for example, economic legislation is at
issue."48 The Court further emphasizes that judicial examination of the evi-
dence supporting the state's interest in regulating is an essential portion of the
undue burden inquiry, crucial in both the Court's decisions in Casey and in
Carhart." Where the Fifth Circuit held that judges may not inquire into the
factual grounds of the state's interest in regulating, the Supreme Court holds
that judges must, quoting Carhart: "The Court retains an independent consti-
tutional duty to review factual findings where constitutional rights are at
stake."so The Court's decision is rich with factual findings of the district court
and of amici that bear on the balance of benefits and burdens in the case.
As we have observed, Casey provides a framework to evaluate health-
justified restrictions on abortion: "Unnecessary health regulations that have the
purpose or effect of presenting a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an
43. See id. at 1448-49.
44. See id. at 1448-49, 1480.
45. Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2309-10 (2016) (observing that
"[t]he Court of Appeals' articulation of the relevant standard is incorrect" and "simply does
not match the standard that this Court laid out in Casey").
46. Id. at 2309.
47. Id. at 2310.
48. Id. at 2309.
49. Id. at 2310.
5o. Id. (quoting Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 165 (2007)).
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abortion impose an undue burden on the right."" Whole Woman's Health ap-
plies Casey's undue burden framework to the admitting privileges and surgical
center requirements and concludes that "neither of these provisions confers
medical benefits sufficient to justify the burdens upon access that each impos-
es."52
Some commentators have read Whole Woman' Health as little more than a
mechanical exercise in cost-benefit analysis." But reading the opinion in this
fashion overlooks how the Court clarifies the law defining what counts as a
benefit and a burden to be balanced within the Casey framework. In what fol-
lows, we examine how the Court assessed the benefits conferred and burdens
imposed by the Texas law. Each of these aspects of the Court's ruling will guide
judges called upon to determine the constitutionality of health-justified re-
strictions on abortion; as we show, they should guide evaluation of fetal-
protective restrictions on abortion as well.5 4
A. Evidence-Based Balancing
Justice Breyer's unusually close examination of the facts as he identifies and
balances the benefits and burdens of the Texas law models a kind of scrutiny
that few TRAP laws could withstand.ss In reviewing the detailed evidence pro-
vided in trial by the plaintiffs' experts and on appeal by medical organizations
51. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992).
52. Whole Woman' Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2300.
53. See, e.g., Noah Feldman, Will Cost-Benefit Test Be New Tool for Abortion Foes?, CHI. TRIB.
(June 27, 2016, 5:44 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/conrmentary
/ct-abortion-restrictions-texas-supreme-court-2ol6o627-story.html [http://perma.cc
/NK3X-NVAW]; see also Kevin C. Walsh, Symposium: The Constitutional Law of Abortion
After Whole Woman's Health - What Comes Next? SCOTUSBLOG (June 28, 2016,
10:56 AM), http://www.scotusblog.coM/2o16/o6/syniposium-the-constitutional-law-of
-abortion-after-whole-womans-health-what-comes-next/ [http://perma.cc/ZSQT-RCGB].
54. As the Court points out, the undue-burden framework, requiring courts to balance a law's
benefits against the burdens it imposes, applies to the range of abortion restrictions that
serve state interests beyond women's health. Whole Woman' Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2309. Ca-
sey, of course, applied the undue burden framework to fetal-protective as well as health-
justified restrictions on abortion. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 882, 885-86, 887-98 (applying the
undue burden framework to the dissuasive counseling, waiting period, and spousal notice
requirements).
ss. Leading antiabortion advocates read Whole Woman's Health as restricting the TRAP strategy.
Even AUL agrees, although it plans to press ahead with "more narrowly targeted" regula-
tions of abortion providers. See Julie Rovner, Anti-Abortion Groups Take New Aim with Di-
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as amici, Justice Breyer documents the "virtual absence of any health benefit"5 6
conferred by the Texas law. And examining the evidence about the law's im-
pact-its role in closing clinics and shrinking the available medical care-
Justice Breyer concludes that the law was at cross-purposes with its stated
ends." A "commonsense inference," he observes, is that the effect of the Texas
law "would be harmful to, not supportive of, women's health.""
This evidence-based balancing of the law's benefits and burdens calls into
question Texas' very purpose in enacting the state's health-justified restrictions
on abortion. While the majority never explicitly states that Texas enacted the
admitting privileges and surgical center requirements with a purpose to ob-
struct women's access to abortion, the Court's deep skepticism of the state's ac-
tual motivation shines through the opinion. The Court repeatedly observes
that the restrictions served little or no health benefit, and takes account of
many ways the law adversely affected women's access." Judges are extremely
reluctant to accuse the government of acting with an unconstitutional pur-
pose.o But Whole Woman's Health provides a textbook illustration of how a
court can show unconstitutional purpose without explicitly asserting it.
The fact that, as Justice Breyer shows, Texas singled out abortion for oner-
ous forms of health regulation that it did not apply to procedures of much
greater risk only amplifies this suggestion.1 In her concurring opinion, Justice
56. Whole Woman' Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2313. Justice Breyer points to the absence of health ben-
efits in several ways. See, e.g., id. at 2311-12, 2315.
57. For discussion of the law's impact on the clinics, see id. at 2312-13, 2316-18.
58. Id. at 2318. The opinion is notable for its willingness to step back and assess the likely cumu-
lative impact of the challenged regulations on actual - rather than claimed - health outcomes
for women. See infra Section III.B.
59. See supra text accompanying note 56; infra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
6o. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS 208 (1962) ("There is a wise and ancient doctrine ... that a Court will
not inquire into the motives of a legislative body or assume them to be wrongful." (quoting
United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 299 (1935) (Cardozo, J., dissenting))). In his
first encounter with Wisconsin's admitting privileges law, Judge Posner affirmed a prelimi-
nary injunction while declining to hold that the legislature, which gave doctors a single hol-
iday weekend to come into compliance, "intended to hamstring abortion." He observed:
"Discovering the intent behind a statute is difficult at best because of the collective character
of a legislature, and may be impossible with regard to the admitting-privileges statutes."
Planned Parenthood of Wis. v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3 d 786, 791 (7 th Cir. 2013). But two years
later, in his final ruling on the merits, Judge Posner marshaled the evidence and reached a
conclusion: "the legislature's intention to impose the two-day deadline, the effect of which
would have been to force half the Wisconsin abortion clinics to close for months, is difficult
to explain save as a method of preventing abortions that women have a constitutional right
to obtain." Planned Parenthood of Wis. v. Schimel, 8o6 F.3 d 908, 912 (7 th Cir. 2015).
61. See Whole Woman' Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2315 (comparing the state's regulation of abortion to
its regulation of more dangerous procedures including colonoscopy, liposuction, and child-
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Ginsburg also emphasizes that the state had singled out abortion for onerous
regulation that it did not direct at procedures of greater risk, and observes more
bluntly: "Given those realities, it is beyond rational belief that H.B. 2 could
genuinely protect the health of women, and certain that the law 'would simply
make it more difficult for them to obtain abortions."'6 2
The Court invalidates the Texas law on grounds that cast into doubt the
constitutionality of other TRAP laws that single out abortion for special health
regulation-not only ambulatory surgical center and admitting-privileges
laws,63 but also, for example, laws that prohibit the use of telemedicine for
medication abortion only64 or that require abortion providers to give inspectors
access to many more patient records than health care professionals who "per-
form more complicated procedures and have more adverse outcomes" must
supply.65
In evaluating the state's interest in restricting abortion, the Court closely
scrutinizes scientific evidence marshaled by opposing parties. Evidence-based
balancing of this kind will guide courts in evaluating the state interest in enact-
ing health-justified restrictions on abortion such as laws in Texas and Kansas
birth, the last of which Justice Breyer notes is "14 times more likely than abortion to result in
death").
62. Id. at 2321 (quoting Schimel, 8o6 F.3d at 910). In an interview after the close of the Term
with the Associated Press, Justice Ginsburg explained the motivation for her separate opin-
ion: "I fully subscribe to everything Breyer said, but it was long, and I wanted something
pithy. I wrote to say 'Don't try this anymore?" Mark Sherman, AP Interview: Ginsburg Doesn't
Want To Envision a Trump Win, AsSOCIATED PREss: BIG STORY (July 8, 2016,
11:46 AM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/oda3a641190742669ccodolb9ocds7fa/ap
-interview-ginsburg-reflects-big-cases-scalias-death [http://perma.cc/7DQJ-SE371.
63. Hours after the Court handed down Whole Woman's Health, Alabama's Attorney General an-
nounced that the state would drop its appeal of a U.S. district court decision invalidating the
state's admitting privileges law. See Mike Cason, Alabama AG Luther Strange Says State Will
Drop Appeal of Abortion Ruling, AL (June 27, 2016, 3:54 PM), http://www.al.com
/news/index.ssf/2oi6/o6/alabama ag lutherstrange-says.htnm [http://perma.cc/SQA9
-SKKT]. The state's appeal was pending in the Eleventh Circuit. The Attorney General, Lu-
ther Strange, said that in light of the Supreme Court's ruling, "there is no good faith argu-
ment that Alabama's law remains constitutional." Id. The day after the ruling, the Supreme
Court denied certiorari to two states' appeals of decisions that had invalidated similar laws
in Mississippi (Currier v. Jackson Women's Health Org., 136 S. Ct. 2536 (2016)) and Wis-
consin (Schimel v. Planned Parenthood of Wis., 136 S. Ct. 2545 (2016)). Admitting privileg-
es laws were enacted in about ten states. Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers,
GUTTMACHER INST., http://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/targeted-regulation
-abortion-providers [http://perma.cc/D9D5-FDZC].
64. Planned Parenthood of the Heartland v. Iowa Bd. of Med., 865 N.W.2d 252 (Iowa 2015); see
also Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 5, at 1462.
65. Planned Parenthood of Sw. & Cent. Fla v. Philip, 2016 V/L 3556568, at *6 (N.D. Fla. 2016).
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66requiring scientifically inaccurate warnings that abortion causes breast cancer.
Courts must also weigh scientific evidence when evaluating counseling laws in
at least nine states requiring abortion providers to inform women that they are
more likely to experience psychological harm if they obtain abortions than if
they carry their unplanned pregnancies to term"7 - claims that social scientists
have debunked.68 Evidence-based balancing of this kind should also guide
66. Some states require doctors to give women seeking abortion frightening and highly contest-
ed medical advice, such as that abortion may cause breast cancer. See Counseling and Waiting
Periods for Abortion, GUTTMACHER INST., http://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore
/counseling-and-waiting-periods-abortion [http://perma.cc/8WDE-CFQA] (stating that
Texas and Kansas law require counseling materials to inaccurately assert a link between
abortion and an increased risk of breast cancer, and that the same link is included in counsel-
ing materials in Alaska, Mississippi, and Oklahoma although not specified by state law).
These claims appear in a pamphlet called "A Woman's Right to Know," which the Texas De-
partment of State Health Services publishes and distributes in accordance with state law. See
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 171.012-171.014 (West 2olo); A Woman' Right to
Know, Informational Material, TEXAS DEP'T OF STATE HEALTH SERVS. (2016), http://
www.texasrighttolife.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/o7/NewWRTKdraft.pdf [http://
perma.cc/G3ZR-AVN4]. Claims of this kind should violate Casey's "truthful and not mis-
leading" standard. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992) (dis-
cussing constitutional forms of dissuasion). Government authorities have refuted the
claimed link between abortion and breast cancer. See Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of
Protection: Abortion Restrictions Under Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1720-21 n.81
(2008). For additional respects in which the Texas statement asks providers to provide
women inaccurate information, see Daniel Grossman, State's "Woman's Right
To Know" Booklet Is Lacking, AuSTIN AM.-STATESMAN (Aug. 5, 2016, 5:oo
AM), http://www.mystatesman.com/news/news/opinion/grossman-states-womans-right
-to-know-booldet-is-la/nr9jZ/ [http://perma.cc/MHQ7-8A6V].
67. See Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion, supra note 66 (stating that out of twenty-two
states that have counseling laws that include information on possible psychological respons-
es to abortion, nine states stress negative emotional responses); Katherine Shaw & Alex
Stein, Abortion, Informed Consent, and Regulatory Spillover, 92 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2016)
(manuscript at 11-12) (on file with authors) (listing fourteen states in which doctors must
inform women about the risk of post-abortion depression and describing the spillover
effects these requirements have in states that lack the requirement yet follow a "patient ex-
pectation" informed consent standard).
68. For a comprehensive review of the social science literature regarding mental health and
abortion, see APA Task Force on Mental Health & Abortion, Report of the Task Force on Men-
tal Health and Abortion, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL Ass'N (2008), http://www.apa.org
/pi/women/programs/abortion/mental-health.pdf [http://perma.cc/NBV7-8A9J], which
found that among adult women who have an unplanned pregnancy, the relative risk of men-
tal health problems is no greater if they have a single elective first-trimester abortion than if
they deliver that pregnancy. See also M. Antonia Biggs et al., Does Abortion Increase Women'
Risk for Post-Traumatic Stress? Findings from a Prospective Longitudinal Cohort Study, 6 BMJ
OPEN (2016) (concluding after a longitudinal study of women who sought abortion care
that women who obtained abortions are no more likely to experience post-traumatic stress
symptoms within four years than women who are denied abortions and must carry their
unwanted pregnancies to term).
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courts in evaluating fetal-protective abortion restrictions that rest on contested
factual claims -for example, claims that abortion before viability inflicts fetal
pain.69
B. Evaluating the Impact ofAbortion Restrictions on Women's Lives
Another groundbreaking and perhaps unanticipated aspect of the Whole
Wonan' Health opinion is the Court's manifest concern for the impact of
TRAP laws on women. The Fifth Circuit's narrow reading of Casey would seem
to permit the government to impose any burdens on women's access to abor-
tion short of a criminal ban. Whole Woman's Health categorically rejects that
view.
In Whole Woman's Health, the Court evaluates the burdens of abortion re-
strictions with the same care it devotes to evaluating the benefits of abortion
restrictions. In identifying the burdens imposed by the Texas law, the Court
describes how enforcing the law would transform women's experience of abor-
tion, and treats these changes in the conditions of access as constitutionally
cognizable harms to women. The Court observes that the admitting privileges
law led to the closure of half of Texas' clinics, and notes: "Those closures meant
fewer doctors, longer waiting times, and increased crowding.""o To this Court it
matters not only whether women can ultimately manage to get an abortion, but
also how the state degrades the conditions in which women must make and act
on decisions about abortion. The Fifth Circuit read Casey as authorizing state
laws that inflict on women increased driving distances of up to 15o miles." But
69. For an account of laws on fetal pain, see Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion,
GUTTMACHER INST., http://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/counseling-and
-waiting-periods-abortion [http://perma.cc/4KET-UB6N], which lists the twelve states
that require counseling on the ability of the fetus to feel pain, the thirty-three states that re-
quire that women be told the gestational age of the fetus, and the twenty-eight states that
require counseling on fetal development throughout pregnancy. For a recent statement by
the American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists on research refuting the claim
that the fetus at 20 weeks development can feel pain, see Texas-ACOG Statement Opposes
Texas Fetal Pain Legislation, HB 2364, AM. CONG. OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS
(Apr. 10, 2013), http://www.acog.org/-/media/Departments/State-Legislative-Activities
/2o3o 4 1oCookLtr.pdf [http://perma.cc/SV4J-847B]. See also Susan J. Lee et al., Fetal Pain:
A Systematic Multidisciplinary Review of the Evidence, 294 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 947 (2005); Mark
S. DeFrancesco, No Evidence to Show Fetal Pain in Second Trimester, MEDSCAPE (May 27,
2015), http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/845157 [http://perma.cc
/KU6S-Y 75 F].
70. Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2313 (2016).
71. See Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 748 F.3d 583, 598(5 th Cir. 2014); Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 734
F.3d 4 o6, 415 (5 th Cir. 2013).
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Whole Woman' Health repudiates this understanding of Casey. The Court rec-
ognizes that, especially when considered in combination with other burdens,
increased driving distances may count as a constitutionally cognizable obstacle
to women's exercise of their rights.72
While the Fifth Circuit reasoned as if Casey and the Constitution allowed
the state to impose almost any obstacle to abortion short of criminalization, in
Whole Woman' Health the Court assesses the impact of an abortion restriction
in constitutional terms sensitive to women's experience in making and carrying
out a decision to end a pregnancy. The Court considers restrictions cumulative-
ly and in context, describing how, taken as a whole, they will alter the lived
conditions of exercising the abortion right. These concerns are evident in the
way the majority assesses the impact of the surgical center requirement:
[I] n the face of no threat to women's health, Texas seeks to force wom-
en to travel long distances to get abortions in crammed-to-capacity su-
perfacilities. Patients seeking these services are less likely to get the kind
of individualized attention, serious conversation, and emotional sup-
port that doctors at less taxed facilities may have offered. Healthcare fa-
cilities and medical professionals are not fungible commodities. Surgi-
cal centers attempting to accommodate sudden, vastly increased
demand ... may find that quality of care declines."
In analyzing how a restriction on abortion will detrimentally alter the con-
ditions in which women exercise their right to an abortion, the Court assesses
constitutionally cognizable harms in ways that should guide judges in applying
the undue burden framework to laws enacted to protect potential life as well as
women's health. Whole Woman' Health does not speak to the weight that any
given judge will attach to the state's interest in enacting restrictions on abortion
to protect fetal life. But the decision contains law governing the identification
of benefits and burdens in such cases. The decision guides judges in evaluating
claims of scientific fact that a state may assert to justify fetal-protective regula-
tion,74 and the decision guides judges in evaluating the burdens on women's
access to abortion that fetal-protective restrictions may impose. For these rea-
sons, Whole Woman's Health will have consequences for the constitutionality of
fetal-protective as well as health-justified restrictions on abortion.
72. See Whole Woman' Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2313.
73. Id. at 2318.
74. See supra note 69 (discussing fetal-pain) and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
In securing women's control over the abortion decision, Casey safeguards
women's liberty, equality, and dignity." We have argued that this core constitu-
tional commitment should continue to guide judges in evaluating the constitu-
tionality of abortion restrictions, whether health-justified or fetal-protective. 6
Whole Woman' Health does not expressly discuss the constitutional values
at the core of the abortion right. But the Court demonstrates its attention to the
constitutional values at stake in the care it devotes to scrutinizing the facts"
and to identifying and balancing benefits and burdens under the Casey frame-
work. Concern for protecting women's liberty, equality, and dignity guides the
majority's close scrutiny of the rationale for health regulations that obstruct ac-
cess to abortion, and its sensitivity to the impact of these laws on women's
lives.
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